Equity Rising? <em>Commonwealth Oil &amp; Gas Co Ltd v Baxter</em> by Carr, Daniel
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equity Rising? Commonwealth Oil & Gas Co Ltd v Baxter
Citation for published version:
Carr, D 2010, 'Equity Rising? Commonwealth Oil & Gas Co Ltd v Baxter' Edinburgh Law Review, vol. 14,
pp. 273-80. DOI: 10.3366/E1364980910001332
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.3366/E1364980910001332
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
Edinburgh Law Review
Publisher Rights Statement:
©Carr, D. (2010). Equity Rising? Commonwealth Oil & Gas Co Ltd v Baxter. Edinburgh Law Review, 14, 273-
80doi: 10.3366/E1364980910001332
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
Analysis
EdinLR Vol 14 pp 269-273
DOI: 10.3366/E1364980910001320
Final Appellate Jurisdiction in the Scottish Legal
System: The End of the Anomaly?
In December 2008 the Cabinet Secretary for Justice asked Professor Neil Walker,
Regius Professor of Public Law and the Law of Nature and Nations in the University
of Edinburgh, to undertake an examination of final appellate jurisdiction in the
Scottish legal system in the light of the establishment of the new United Kingdom
Supreme Court by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. In working out the new
court’s jurisdiction, it will be recalled, no attempt had been made to address the his-
torical anomaly whereby appeals lay to the House of Lords from the Court of Session
but not from theHigh Court of Justiciary. The failure to address the anomaly attracted
some criticism at the time.1 A subsequent attempt by Nationalist MSP Adam Ingram
to abolish the right of appeal in civil cases by means of a member’s bill in the Scottish
Parliament effectively failed when the Presiding Officer ruled that a large number of
the bill’s provisions were outside the Parliament’s legislative competence.2 It was no
surprise therefore that a Nationalist government should come back to the question.
A reading of Professor Walker’s report3 prompts a number of questions: about the
nature of modern Scots law, by which I mean Scots law ten years after devolution;
about the relationship between the different legal systems that make up the United
Kingdom; about UK law and GB law, which appear “as through a glass darkly” at
various points in the report; and about the essential nature of United Kingdom
institutions such as the Supreme Court — are we to understand them as genuinely
United Kingdom institutions, or are they essentially English institutions with a United
Kingdom gloss, or a sometimes uneasy combination of the two?— Immediate interest
in the report, however, is less likely to lie in these questions than in the six models
of reform set out in the final chapter. Six models – nine if we include the variations
on three of the models –might seem rather too many. Analysis reveals, however, that
there are essentially four underlying models of reform, of which only two are practical
1 J Chalmers, “Scottish appeals and the proposed Supreme Court” (2004) 8 EdinLR 4; G Gretton,
“Scotland and the Supreme Court” 2003 SLT (News) 265; H MacQueen, “Scotland and a Supreme
Court for the UK?” 2003 SLT (News) 279; C Himsworth, “A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom”
2003 SCOLAG 178.
2 The bill was the Civil Appeals (Scotland) Bill 2006. For discussion, see C Himsworth “Presiding officer
statements on the competence of bills” (2007) 11 EdinLR 397.
3 Scottish Government, Final Appellate Jurisdiction in the Scottish Legal System (2010, available at
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2010/01/19154813/0).
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possibilities at the present time: the status quo and what we might term “Scots law
plus” or “Scots law max”.
A. THE MODELS
Model 1 – a fully autonomous appellate court system– is the independence model,
which of course is not an option until such time as independence is an option.
The report, however, includes an interesting discussion of what the final appellate
jurisdiction in an independent Scotland might look like, and in particular how
constitutional cases might be treated. It suggests that the Irish model of a self-
standing Supreme Court with separate procedures for ordinary and constitutional
cases would offer the ideal blueprint, but it should be remembered that Kelsen’s
alternative model of a separate constitutional court had its origins in an unwillingness
to entrust decisions of such importance to the ordinary courts. The question for an
independent Scotland would indeed be whether it was willing to do so.
Model 2 – the fully integrated model with criminal and civil appeals as well as
devolution issues being dealt with in London – pursues the logic of a unitary state
to its ultimate conclusion. Since no one has ever proposed this, either at the time of
the Union or since, it is not clear why it was felt necessary to include it, but the report
waxes suitably indignant at the prospect of the “disappearance” of Scots law and the
“effective destruction” of the Scottish legal system.4
Model 3 is the status quo, which was (re)affirmed when the Constitutional Reform
Act 2005 was under discussion. At that time the United Kingdom government said
there was “no evidence that the Scottish criminal appeals system required change”,
and that the Scottish government was “in principle content for civil appeals to the new
Court to be on the same basis as currently operates in relation to London”, adding
that there “are benefits to the Scottish [civil] justice system in having important
cases reviewed by judges with a different background, and indeed advantages to
the larger jurisdiction also in drawing on the resources of a different legal tradition
at the highest level”.5 The report also finds merit in the status quo, because it is
“able informally to capture with some success the appropriate mix of divergence and
convergence between the separate but inextricable bodies of Scots and English law”.6
But it rejects it as ultimately unsatisfactory, both because it does not address the
anomalous treatment of civil and criminal appeals, and because it cannot guarantee
the things that ensure “continuing respect for and commitment to the development
of Scots law as a ‘relatively autonomous’ achievement”.7 The report identifies these
things as: a healthy flow of “good cases”, continuing Scottish representation on
the Supreme Court – here the report arguably underestimates the strength of the
safeguards of the separate identity of Scots law in the 2005 Act – and a commitment
4 Ch 6.3.1.
5 Department for Constitutional Affairs,Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom
(2003) paras 26-27.
6 Scottish Government, Final Appellate Jurisdiction (n 3) ch 6.4.
7 Ch 6.4.
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on the part of the non-Scottish members of the Supreme Court to Scots law qua Scots
law.8
Whether institutional reform alone can guarantee these things is an interesting
question. Before we turn to the other three models, however, we should pause
to note one feature of the status quo which the report leaves out of the account,
but which is crucial to any consideration of the final appellate jurisdiction, and
that is a Scottish Parliament with legislative competence over many areas of what
is understood by Scots law. The Supreme Court in all its wisdom may say “the
law is X” but it is perfectly open to the Scottish Parliament, within the limits of
its legislative competence, to say “the law is Y”. The Damages (Asbestos-related
Conditions) (Scotland) Act 2009 in which the Parliament took a different view from
the House of Lords on whether pleural plaques should be actionable in damages
offers a striking example in what might be regarded as one of the core areas of
traditional Scots law.9 The question of final appellate jurisdiction needs therefore
to be seen in its proper constitutional context, a constitutional context that is
rather more favourable to Scots law than the report’s assessment of the status quo
suggests.
The remaining three models might be treated under the heading of “Scots law
plus” or “Scots law max”. What they have in common is that they are directed to the
more appropriate treatment of Scottish appeals that raise distinctly Scottish issues
within the limits of our current constitutional arrangements; what is sought in these
models is a final appellate system “guaranteed to treat with appropriate distinctiveness
those areas of Scots law – civil and criminal – that diverge substantially from English
law”.10
Model 4 – a Scottish chamber or division of the Supreme Court –would see the
Supreme Court “reconfigured and ‘federalized’ such that in all or some Scottish cases
it would sit as a dedicated Scottish divisional court with only Scottish judges serving,
or at least with a guarantee of a majority of Scottish judges”.11 The attractions of
this model are not obvious save that it would be possible for the Supreme Court to
come to Edinburgh – or Airdrie – but its essential weakness is that it overlooks the
very real Scottish interest in the appeals from the rest of the United Kingdom that
make up the bulk of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The danger in our current
constitutional arrangements is not that of the effective destruction of the Scottish
legal system– the Parliament is guarantee enough against that – but rather that
Scottish interests are assumed to be identical to those of England, overwhelmingly
the most important jurisdiction in the United Kingdom, and it is for that reason if
no other that Scottish representation on the Supreme Court will continue to be of
paramount importance.
8 Ibid.
9 A challenge to the vires of the Act failed in Axa General Insurance Ltd and others, Ptrs [2010] CSOH 2,
2010 SLT 179: see FMcCarthy, “Actionable rights and wrongs: human rights challenges in AXA General
Insurance Ltd” (2010) 14 EdinLR 284.
10 Scottish Government, Final Appellate Jurisdiction (n 3) ch 6.3.2 (emphasis in original).
11 Ch 6.5.
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Model 6 would see the Supreme Court recast as the United Kingdom equivalent
of the European Court of Justice, responding to requests for preliminary rulings from
the “member states”. The report rejects this model on the grounds that its advantages
seem more apparent than real, and are in any case offset by other objections.12
That leaves model 5 – the preferred model of a “quasi-federal Supreme Court”.13
Under this model there would be a requirement of leave, in place of the currently
unrestricted right of appeal, and only those Scottish cases that were of common
interest – criminal as well as civil – would be heard by the Supreme Court, preferably
at a Scottish location, leaving distinctly Scottish cases to be dealt with by the Scottish
courts. The current absence of a right of appeal in criminal matters, save indirectly
in respect of devolution issues, would therefore be ended in favour of a more limited
right of appeal to the Supreme Court in both criminal and civil matters.
The report addresses the criteria by which distinctly Scottish cases might be
distinguished from those of common interest. The boundary between reserved and
devolved matters features but as only one of a number of possible starting points.
Given, however, that it is the basis of the Parliament’s legislative competence, it
is difficult not to see it as the basis of the final appellate jurisdiction as well. The
report argues that, were it to be used, the result would be to exclude “some matters
of common principle which lack . . . a common statutory background”,14 but the
preferred alternative of “matters common” sounds like an invitation to rewrite the
devolution settlement under the guise of addressing matters of common interest. In
this respect as in others the report may be said to take insufficient account of how
far we have travelled and to make too much of the lack of “fixity and finality” in our
current constitutional arrangements.15
The report sidesteps the question of the “repatriation” of criminal appeals raising
devolution issues on the grounds that this is a matter for London.16 Given that this
is one of the real points of contention in the current system, the lack of discussion
both here and in the report of the Calman Commission17 is to be regretted. Scotland
was regarded as perfectly capable of running its own criminal justice system in 1876,
when the House of Lords finally declined jurisdiction in criminal appeals,18 and it is
by no means obvious that Convention rights alone provide sufficient justification for
departing from that view now.
B. CONCLUSION
Short of independence, therefore, what the report proposes is not the wholesale
abandonment of appeals to London or the repatriation of civil appeals from London
12 Ch 6.7.
13 Ch 6.6.
14 Ch 6.6 n 36.
15 Ch 2.4.
16 Ch 6.6.
17 Commission on Scottish Devolution, Serving Scotland Better: Scotland and the United Kingdom in the
21st Century (2009) paras 5.31-5.37.
18 Mackintosh v Lord Advocate (1876) 3 R (HL) 34.
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but a more restricted right of appeal in criminal as well as civil matters. The report
makes for heavy going in places, but one feels that Professor Walker is pointing us in
the right direction. In a system in which the law is increasingly made in Edinburgh,
it will come to be seen as more and more anomalous for questions about that law,
issues of legislative competence aside, to be answered in London – even if London
does come to Edinburgh for the purpose of answering them. Just as the final say on
European law lies in Luxembourg and Strasbourg, and the final say on English law,
and, for the time being at least, UK law and GB law, lies in London, so too we would
expect the final say on a renascent Scots law to lie in Edinburgh. Such is the nature
of our “pluralist” or as I would prefer to think of it “multi-level” legal system.
That is not to say it will happen or happen quickly. “Nationalists end centuries-old
tie with London.” The prospect of such headlines may prompt nationalists to pause
until such time as bigger questions are resolved, or, more sensibly, to wrap up the
question of final appellate jurisdiction with the Gill Review. In the meantime there
may be more merit in the current arrangements than the report allows.
Alan Page
University of Dundee
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Equity Rising? Commonwealth Oil & Gas Co
Ltd v Baxter
The duties of a fiduciary can seem clear. The central duty, from which all others may
be said to flow, is one of loyalty1 – the fiduciary must exercise fidelity to the interests
of his constituent. But the law relating to fiduciaries does not admit of simplification
quite so conveniently. It is one thing to say that a fiduciary owes a duty of loyalty; it
is quite another to identify what makes someone a fiduciary, let alone consider the
competing legal mechanisms that protect the fiduciary’s constituent.
The legal tools that might be used to regulate fiduciary misconduct are varied. The
most likely mechanisms may entail the following remedial responses: personal gain-
based remedies, possibly derived from the prohibition against unjustified enrichment;
personal delictual or reparatory remedies constituted by wrongful conduct; the
imposition of a constructive trust; or other proprietary remedy which might flow
from the law of trusts. It will be clear that these conceptually distinct remedial
responses give different measures of recovery, and indeed affect third parties in
different ways. In Commonwealth Oil & Gas Co Ltd v Baxter,2 the Inner House
1 See M Conaglen, “The nature and function of fiduciary loyalty” (2005) 121 LQR 452.
2 Commonwealth Oil & Gas Co Ltd v Baxter [2009] CSIH 75, 2009 SLT 1123.
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had to consider fiduciary liability in relation to an action of damages raised by an oil
company, Commonwealth Oil & Gas Co Ltd, against one of its former non-executive
directors, Nicholas Baxter, and another company, Eurasia Energy Ltd.
A. THE FACTS
The facts may be summarised as follows.3 Baxter and an associate formed and
incorporated Commonwealth Oil in Anguilla in 1995, and Baxter was made chief
operating officer in addition to his appointment as a director. At this time,
Commonwealth Oil was a wholly owned subsidiary of A & B Geoscience Corporation
(ABG), which itself was originally formed by Baxter and his associate. The companies
were concerned with mineral exploration and exploitation.
In 2001 ABG entered into discussions with Vitol Services Ltd, and an agreement
was reached whereby, in return for finance, Vitol acquired share options and effective
control of Commonwealth Oil. Subsequently, “difficulties arose”4 that effectively
forced Baxter to resign his positions with both companies. In compensation, a number
of termination and consultancy agreements were negotiated. An important aspect
of these related to tax: essentially, if Baxter could retain a directorship he would
reap a significant tax advantage. In April 2004 Baxter was re-appointed a director
of Commonwealth Oil, albeit with no specific management duties or executive
functions.
In February 2005 Baxter offered to assist with developing opportunities for
Commonwealth Oil, as he had in the past. He specifically asked what sorts of
project the company was interested in, to which the response was onshore projects.
At no point did Baxter mention his involvement in a potential offshore project in
Azerbaijan (the Eurasia block). This did not represent, from Baxter’s perspective,
any conflict of interest – as far as he was concerned, the company was not interested
in offshore projects.5 In November 2005 Baxter was appointed president and chief
executive officer of Eurasia Energy Ltd, and on 7 December 2005 a memorandum
of understanding between the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic
(SOCAR) and Eurasia was executed, giving Eurasia the exclusive right to negotiate
exploitation rights with SOCAR. It was accepted in evidence that the conclusion
of the memorandum had been achieved by Baxter using personal contacts and
knowledge obtained independently of his role as a director of Commonwealth Oil.
On 9 December Baxter informed Commonwealth Oil of the conclusion of the
memorandum, resigning his directorship of that company shortly thereafter.
3 Space prevents a detailed discussion of the convoluted facts, especially the numerous different legal
persons: for an exhaustive account seeCommonwealth Oil & Gas Co Ltd at paras 29-70, and the decision
at first instance: [2007] CSOH 198 at paras 4-153 per Lord Reed.
4 [2009] CSIH 75 at para 29 per Lord Nimmo Smith.
5 Later, Commonwealth Oil was to regard this view as “ludicrous”, on the basis that what made mineral
exploitation in Azerbaijan difficult was not finding and exploiting oil fields but securing an agreement
with SOCAR to allow such exploitation in the first place. Baxter had shown himself to be effective at
concluding such agreements.
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Commonwealth Oil sought damages from both Baxter and Eurasia on the basis
that Baxter, while still a director, had diverted to Eurasia a valuable commercial
opportunity.
B. DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARY LIABILITY
The legal issues for the court were tailored according to the defenders: the first
legal issue related to the fact that Baxter was a director of the pursuer, and hence
a fiduciary; the second issue concerned the liability of Eurasia, and as such was
dependent upon Baxter’s fiduciary character.
Baxter argued that a director’s duty of loyalty was breached only where there was
a conflict between a director’s personal interests and those of his constituent, and
where the conflicting interests arose from the exercise of his functions as director.
This allowed Baxter to argue that, because the exploitation opportunity arose from
activities outwith his role as a director of Commonwealth Oil, he could not be held to
have breached his core duty of loyalty.6 The Inner House had no difficulty in rejecting
that argument,7 though it was recognised that in circumstances where the constituent
company had no interest at all there might not be a breach of the duty of loyalty. The
key question of law was whether there was a “real sensible possibility of conflict”.8 It
was held that there was a real sensible possibility that Commonwealth Oil would be
interested in Baxter’s agreement with SOCAR. To secure the tax advantage that the
directorship was intended to achieve that office had to be real, and as such carried all
the incidents of that office. Lord Nimmo Smith rejected the argument that Baxter’s
effective removal from executive functions for Commonwealth Oil rendered his
directorship an empty shell without concomitant duties to the company.9 This aspect
of the decision is entirely consonant with the leading authorities on fiduciary liability
and must be correct. More broadly, the decision is the latest of many assertions
that Scottish and English authorities relating to the breach of a director’s duty of
loyalty, and probably with respect to fiduciary duties generally, are as one in terms of
content,10 even if their conceptual bases might be different.
6 Relying upon London and Mashonaland Exploration Company Ltd v New Mashonaland Exploration
Company Ltd [1891] WN 165; Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd [1932] AC 161.
7 Relying on the standard authorities in the area: Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Bros (1854) 1 Macq 461;
Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44; Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46.
8 Commonwealth Oil at para 78.
9 Para 78, and the Lord President (Hamilton) expressly concurred with this reasoning at para 13.
10 One should enter an important caveat here relating to a positive duty upon a director to disclose
information to the company. At first instance the Lord Ordinary (Reed) stated, following consideration
of English authorities, that a director would have to disclose such information: [2007] CSOH 198 at
paras 183-185. The Lord President (at para 14) reserved his opinion on this matter, emphasising that
the duties of a fiduciary are proscriptive and not prescriptive, and Lord Nimmo Smith appeared to go
further by distancing himself from such an approach (at para 82).
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C. KNOWING RECEIPT
The legal issue which pertained to the liability of Eurasia will perhaps engender more
unease. A form of liability of a recipient of property from a dishonest trustee or
fiduciary is commonly known as “knowing receipt”, while the liability of a third party
assisting a trustee or fiduciary in breaching a fiduciary obligation is commonly termed
“knowing assistance”. Relying upon the doctrine of knowing receipt, the pursuer
claimed that it was entitled to “reparation” from Eurasia on the basis that Eurasia
had benefited from Baxter’s breach of his fiduciary duties. The court’s decision on
this point rested upon a narrow basis:11 in order to incur liability for knowing receipt
there must be trust property which is capable of being disposed of by the trustee or
fiduciary. This conclusion flows inexorably from the fact that liability for knowing
receipt in English law is “receipt-based” – the action flows from receiving trust
property. In Commonwealth Oil there was no ground for knowing receipt because
there was no trust property.12 This aspect of the decision must be correct – one may
contract for future property but one may not own it – though there are broader issues
that emerge from the decision.
D. ANALYSIS
A major question posed by the case is the extent to which the doctrines of knowing
receipt and knowing assistance constitute useful components of the law of Scotland;
further, there is a related question as to whether these nominate doctrines actually do
constitute the law of Scotland. The Inner House appeared to accept that, if there had
been trust property involved, the doctrine of knowing receipt would have operated.
In respect of the usefulness of the doctrines one should remember that the locus
classicus of these forms of liability is the judgment of Lord Selborne in Barnes v
Addy,13 a decision of the Court of Appeal in Chancery, which pre-dated the fusion of
equity and law courts,14 and as such rests heavily upon equitable principles and talks
in terms of constructive trusteeship.
In respect of knowing receipt – unlike knowing assistance15 – a clearly enunciated
approach in a leading case is still awaited in England to clarify enduring questions
with respect to the features of such liability, and particularly the quality of third party
11 Relying upon the leading English case of El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc [1994] 2 All ER 685 at
700 per Hoffmann LJ.
12 Commonwealth Oil at paras 94-96 per Lord Nimmo Smith.
13 Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244 at 251-252.
14 A process achieved through various Judicature Acts, 1873-75.
15 In England the doctrine of “knowing assistance”, or perhaps more accurately now “dishonest
assistance”, has been the subject of considerable development and clarification at the highest level:
Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378; Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, [2002] 2 AC
164; Barlow Clowes International Ltd (In Liquidation) v Eurotrust International Ltd [2005] UKPC
37, [2006] 1 WLR 1476; Abou-Rahmah v Abacha [2006] EWCA Civ 1492, [2007] All ER (Comm) 827;
Starglade Properties v Nash [2009] EWHC 148 (Ch).
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knowledge required, in a world of fusion between equity and the common law.16
What is clear is that liability for knowing receipt in England is increasingly seen as a
personal remedy –whether such personal liability rests upon the basis of an equitable
wrong of receiving trust property with some, as yet unsettled, degree of knowledge,17
or upon personal liability for receipt which is strict and flows from the principles of
unjust enrichment.18 There are also proprietary remedies which can arise in areas
close to the fact situations in which liability for knowing receipt arises. Therefore,
following the clarification in Foskett v McKeown,19 it is clear that beneficiaries of a
trust may raise proprietary claims based upon either following or tracing. However,
it must be kept in mind that such proprietary remedies lie upon a different ground
from the personal liability with which knowing receipt is concerned. Knowing receipt
is therefore used to fix personal liability upon a “beneficial recipient”20 of property,
and often features in cases where the recipient has consumed or otherwise dispersed
the property.
In Commonwealth Oil the Lord President (Hamilton) states that “[a]uthority in
Scotland on the requisites of liability for knowing receipt is sparse. It is, however,
clear that its foundation lies in the law of trusts. . . ”.21 In truth the authority for
the nominate doctrine of knowing receipt (as opposed to another form of personal
liability)22 is sparse indeed.23 Of course, the substance of third party personal liability
might be found elsewhere in the law, such as within the law of reparation or
unjustified enrichment, but, crucially, not expressed as those nominate claims derived
from the Chancery jurisprudence of Barnes v Addy.
Later in his judgment the Lord President states “I would add only that knowing
receipt appears to me to be, primarily at least, a restitutionary remedy”.24 His
16 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, “Knowing receipt: the need for a new landmark”, inWCornish et al (eds),
Restitution, Past, Present and Future: Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones (1998); R Walker, “Dishonesty
and unconscionable conduct in commercial life – some reflections on accessory liability and knowing
receipt” (2005) 27 Sydney LR 187; M Bryan, “The liability of the recipient: restitution at common law
or wrongdoing in equity?” in S Degeling and J Edelman (eds), Equity in Commercial Law (2005) 327;
G Virgo, “The role of fault in the law of restitution”, in A Burrows and A Rodger (eds), Mapping the
Law: Essays in Memory of Peter Birks (2006) 83.
17 S Elliott and C Mitchell, “Remedies for dishonest assistance” (2004) 67 MLR 16; C Mitchell,
“Dishonest assistance, knowing receipt, and the law of limitation” (2008) 72 Conv 226. See also Farah
Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Ltd [2007] HCA 22.
18 See the references in n 16 above.
19 Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102.
20 If legal title passed to the recipient, the doctrine of knowing receipt is not applicable because a common
law duty arises to compensate the value of the property, and there is no role for the intervention of
equity: Criterion Properties plc v Stratford [2004] UKHL 28, [2004] 1 WLR 1846.
21 Commonwealth Oil at para 16, citing A J P Menzies, The Law of Scotland Affecting Trustees, 2nd edn
(1913) para 1271. The danger of relying upon Menzies as an authority on Scottish law, given its free use
of English precedents, has been expressed before: G W Wilton, “Trust law” (1933) 45 JR 295 at 295.
22 See the approach taken by the Lord Ordinary (Reed): [2007] CSOH 198 at para 197.
23 Before Commonwealth Oil it appears that Barnes v Addy had been cited in only two Scottish cases:
Raes v Meek (1886) 13 R 1036 and Bank of Scotland v Macleod Paxton Woolard & Co 1998 SLT 258 at
274 per Lord Coulsfield.
24 Commonwealth Oil at para 20.
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meaning, however, is unclear because “restitution” can refer either to an enrichment
or to a proprietary claim. The Lord President may have been expressing the view
that “knowing receipt” in Scots law, as a personal remedy, rests upon the principle
against unjustified enrichment following the developing English analysis along similar
lines.25 Or again the suggestion may be that there is a distinctly Scottish personal
“restitutionary” liability arising from the law of trusts. Yet, the mention of restitution
and trusts might also be understood to relate to a form of proprietary action, especially
because in Commonwealth Oil & Gas Co the pleadings sought specific property,
and the judgments appear to proceed on this basis.26 Such an approach, if relying
upon English law, would rest upon a misapprehension of that law by conflating the
personal and the proprietary. The liability that triggers a claim for knowing receipt
is personal. Different legal mechanisms deal with proprietary claims for following
specific property or tracing its proceeds.
The judgment of Lord Nimmo Smith might be interpreted as going further:27
It appears to me to be clear from the authorities quoted above that knowing receipt depends
in the first place on the prior existence of an asset which is subject to a trust in favour of
a beneficiary. It is the disposal of that asset, in breach of fiduciary duty, and receipt of that
asset by the recipient in knowledge of that breach, which together give rise to a constructive
trust over that asset in the hands of the recipient.
Lord Nimmo Smith’s first sentence is unimpeachable with respect to the
requirements of the personal knowing receipt liability in English law, but its relation
to the second sentence is likely to provoke interest. In English law the recipient in
such a scenario might be subject to proprietary liability, but arguably only because
there is an identifiable trust asset which can be followed or traced and in which
the beneficiary may claim his continuing beneficial interest. If the asset, or more
accurately the beneficial interest which it contains, is not capable of being traced or
followed, a claim for “knowing receipt” may lie, and may be described as flowing from
or erecting a “constructive trust”, but the liability dictated by such a constructive trust
is almost certainly personal.28
It may be that Lord Nimmo Smith considered that the constructive trust he
identified was such a personal constructive trust. On the other hand, the constructive
trust conceived of might have been proprietary, and there are residual authorities,
especially in Australia, that suggest liability for knowing receipt might entail
something like a proprietary constructive trust.29 It does seem odd that a doctrine
which has little apparent credence in Scots law should be adopted in its strongest
form, by reference to English authority, when English authority appears to be moving
away from such an approach.
25 See n 16 above.
26 See Commonwealth Oil at para 20.
27 Para 94.
28 Dubai Aluminium Company Ltd v Salaam [2002] UKHL 48, [2003] 2 AC 366 at paras 132-142 per
Lord Millett.
29 See Bryan (n 16).
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If there is a form of “knowing receipt” liability in Scots law which is indeed
a proprietary claim from the law of trusts, a number of broader difficulties arise
from the facts of this case in particular. It is submitted that receiving property from
the trustee of a proper trust fund, whether express or constructive (if one accepts
constructive trusts in Scots law), is not necessarily the same as receiving property
which was being administered by a fiduciary.30 A fiduciary, in this case a company
director acting within his fiduciary role does not own the company property: the
company owns the company property. It is thus difficult to see the scope for a
proprietary remedy, presumably from the law of trusts, in respect of the recipient,
for there is no trust fund or property to be aware of. If, however, one accepts that a
proprietary constructive trust attaches to the property that a company director obtains
in breach of his fiduciary duty, then clearly the proprietary dimension alters. The
Inner House’s approach to “knowing receipt” suggests it was meant in a proprietary
sense. Following its (justified) emphasis upon the need for a pre-existing trust asset
or fund to ground an action for knowing receipt, the only way in which the recipient
of property from a company director could be the subject of a proprietary (or indeed
personal claim) would be if such a constructive trust existed. Such an approach raises
the spectre of requiring the imposition of a proprietary constructive trust to create
the basis for an accessory constructive trust.31
E. CONCLUSION
The uncertainty surrounding the proper use of the term “constructive trust” in
England has clear implications in relation to remedial responses to an action resting
upon knowing receipt. Similarly contested theories, and difficulties, exist within
Scots law, often as a result of the influence of English equity. There is no doubt
that Scots law should, and indeed does, recognise personal liability with respect
to factual situations similar to those dealt with by knowing assistance and knowing
receipt. Looking to the content of the rules relating to knowing receipt and knowing
assistance, as developed in the Common Law world, is therefore important. Care,
however, must be taken to understand the context within which those rules operate,
so that any adoption is conscious and deliberate. The Scots equivalent of knowing
(or unconscionable) receipt might be framed by reference to the law on unjustified
30 It is true that the English notion of knowing receipt is prestable against fiducaries as well as trustees:
see Belmont Finance Corpn Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd (No 2) [1980] 1 All ER 393; Agip (Africa)
Ltd v Jackson [1991] Ch 547; Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378 at 392 per Lord Nicholls
of Birkenhead. This point was noted at first instance in Commonwealth Oil (see [2007] CSOH 198 at
para 196), but not addressed in the Inner House. Of course, applying personal liability for the wrongful
or unjustified receipt of property from a fiduciary is logically sound: the personal liability flows from
the misconduct of the recipient in receiving that property – hence, as we have seen, the lack of a need
to show some variety of dishonesty in the fiduciary beyond the breach of his duties. It is quite another
matter however to attach a proprietary significance to the transfer of property by a fiduciary.
31 The conceptual basis and extent of the constructive trust in Scots law is contested, as it is in England:
see G L Gretton “Constructive trusts” (1997) 1 EdinLR 281 and 408; C Harpum, “The uses and abuses
of constructive trusts: the experience of England and Wales” (1997) 1 EdinLR 437.
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enrichment, and the Scots equivalent of knowing (or dishonest) assistance might be
framed by reference to the law of delict; on the other hand, they might be dealt
with by the law of trusts (and/or fiduciary liability) with proprietary consequences.
Commonwealth Oil & Gas does not provide a definitive answer to these interrelated
uncertainties, beyond the apparent acceptance of the term “knowing receipt” as part
of Scots law. Therefore, to an already uncertain sea of concepts and authority we
may now add the new currents of the terms “knowing receipt and assistance” – and
the intellectual baggage that they carry. It remains to be seen whether these new
currents will calm the waters, or make them that bit choppier.
Daniel J Carr
University of Dundee
The author is grateful to Niall Whitty and Ross Anderson for comments and help in
the preparation of this note.
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Missives by Fax or PDF?
Contracts for the sale of land are subject to a requirement of form. They must be
in writing, and signed.1 But what about delivery? Can an offer or an acceptance – a
missive – be sent by fax, or, what comes to the same thing, by a pdf attachment to
an email? In practice missives are often sent by fax or pdf.2 When this happens,
the practice is also to send the original by mail, courier or hand delivery, and so the
question of whether a missive sent in this way is a valid missive seldom arises, for even
if it is not valid, the original arrives hard on its heels.
It matters only if something unexpected happens between (i) the time when the
addressee receives the fax or pdf and (ii) the time when the addressee receives the
original. The “something unexpected” might be one side having second thoughts
about the deal. In Park, Ptrs (No 2)3 it was third-party action, namely an inhibition
against the seller. Missives were concluded for the sale of a property in Bothwell,
Lanarkshire. Temporary Judge M G Thomson QC takes up the story:4
On 31 August 2007, at about 14.50 hours, SM faxed to CBC a copy of an executed qualified
acceptance still bearing the date 10 August 2007. Later that afternoon and during business
hours CBC faxed to SM a copy of an executed final letter accepting the qualified acceptance.
Thereafter, and prior to 1700 hours on 31 August 2007, SM and CBC posted the original
1 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 ss 1, 2.
2 The latter term is used here to refer to a scanned copy of a paper and ink document.
3 [2009] CSOH 122, 2009 SLT 871.
4 Para 5. SM were the petitioners’ solicitors; CBC were solicitors for a prospective purchaser.
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executed qualified acceptance and original executed final letter to each other by Legal Post.
The original executed final letter from CBC reached the offices of SM after midnight on
31 August 2007. The original executed qualified acceptance from SM reached the offices of
CBC on Monday 3 September 2007.
The question was whether missives had been concluded by midnight on the 31
August. That was because there was an inhibition against the sellers whose effective
date was midnight, 31 August. The way the issue came before the court was that
the sellers petitioned for the recall of the inhibition on the ground that it came too
late to affect the missives.5 The inhibitor took the opposite view, namely that by
midnight on 31 August missives had not yet been concluded. There was no dispute
about whether missives had been concluded, because the originals were physically
delivered - shortly after 31 August – so that conclusion of missives had happened at
latest when the originals were physically delivered. The question was when missives
had been concluded: before or after midnight on 31 August? The “postal acceptance
rule” was not applicable on these particular facts, because it applies only to the final
acceptance, and in this case the earlier missive was not received until after the date
of the inhibition.6
A. THE BACKGROUND LAW
The Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 says that signed writing is needed
to conclude missives, but it says nothing about how (or even whether) such signed
writing has to be delivered to the other side, and the same was true of earlier
legislation. The issue of missives by fax has been before the courts twice before. In
Merrick Homes Ltd v Duff, it was said (obiter) at first instance7 that missives can
be concluded by fax but on appeal the court reserved its opinion on the point: “We
should. . . not be taken to be endorsing the view expressed by the Lord Ordinary
where he indicates that an obligatio literis could be constituted by fax”.8 InMcIntosh
v Alam9 it was held that missives can be concluded by fax.
For ordinary contracts the question of delivery does not normally arise, because
they are not subject to requirements of form. They can be concluded orally, either
face-to-face or by phone. They can be concluded silently, for instance at the check-
out queue at a supermarket. Obviously, therefore, they can be concluded by fax, pdf
or text message. Romantic young men can propose marriage by sky-writing or by
5 See para 2: “the petitioners seek recall of that inhibition but in so far only as it relates to the subjects”.
With respect, the petition was in the wrong terms. In such a case it should be for recall of the inhibition
quoad the transaction, not quoad the property: see G LGretton, The Law of Inhibition and Adjudication,
2nd edn (1996) 60. But it seems that this issue was not raised, and it can be ignored for present purposes.
It may be added that the sellers also sought recall on the ground of oppression: see Park, Ptrs [2008]
CSOH 121, 2008 SLT 1026, discussed in J MacLeod, “Chalk dust in the law of inhibition” (2009) 13
EdinLR 294. This issue was not dealt with in this particular phase of the litigation.
6 There is also the question of whether the postal acceptance rule applies to private couriers.
7 1996 GWD 9-508.
8 1996 SC 497 at 499
9 1998 SLT (Sh Ct) 19.
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tracing the big question in newly-fallen snow, and contracts could be concluded in
the same way by romantic business people, if there are romantic business people.
Or by telepathy, if there is telepathy.10 Of course, there can be exceptions. If Jack
writes to Jill making an (unromantic) offer to buy moveables, and the offer says that
acceptance must be by signed letter, then a response by phone would not work, for
the acceptance would not have met the offer. But whatever degree of formality is
employed or insisted on, the need for communication is indispensable. The delivery
of paper is often the means of communication that the parties choose, but that is
a matter of choice, not a requirement of law. Or one could put it another way: in
such cases delivery is needed, but all that means is the delivery of the message, the
manifestation of the will.
So that is the general rule for contracts. At the other side of the room, so to speak,
is the case of a deed, such as a disposition. If the grantee has not received the deed,
it is impossible to complete title. In such cases the issue is not normally whether the
granter is “bound”. Assuming (as is typically the case) that the deed is to implement a
contract, such as missives, the granter is already bound anyway. Missives are different
from ordinary contracts, because there are requirements of form, but also different
from deeds, in that the missives do not need to be registered.
As a unilateral and written juridical act, a missive letter must probably be delivered
if it is to bind the granter. But if delivery is needed, the question then arises as to
whether that has to be actual delivery, or whether something less could suffice. That
“something less” could in principle take two forms. The first would be the sending
of an image of the wet-signed paper, by fax or pdf. Or one could hold the document
to the window and allow the other side, passing in the street, to photograph it. Or
perhaps one could make, and send, an exact copy, done in oil paint. This could be
called “delivery by image”. The second would be for the sender to be deemed to hold
the wet-signed paper on behalf of the other side, a possibility that does not necessarily
involve the receipt, by the other side, of an image. For example, Jack could phone
Jill, read out the words of the letter, and agree with her that he held the letter on her
behalf. This might be called “delivery by agreement”.
B. THE DECISION
In Park, Ptrs the Temporary Judge held that missives had not been concluded by
midnight 31 August. Thus he declined to follow McIntosh v Alam. But he did not go
so far as to say that missives cannot be concluded by fax or pdf. As for that question,
he said:11
The answer. . . depends upon the intention of the parties which may be derived either from
a general practice among solicitors or from a specific agreement between the particular
solicitors exchanging the particular missives.
10 Though for telepathy the question might arise as to the manifestation of will, the Willenserklärung.
11 Para 23.
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By “a general practice among solicitors” he did not mean, I think, a general practice
of sending missives by fax or pdf, but rather a general practice of regarding such
missives as binding. And he considered that no such practice existed. As for “specific
agreement” he said:12
It would. . . be open to the sender of any missive by fax to state thereon that from the time
of transmission of the fax the sending solicitor would thereafter hold the missive which
had been transmitted on behalf of the receiving solicitor, thereby achieving constructive
delivery.
But that had not happened. Since neither branch of the “intention” test had been
satisfied, missives had not been concluded before the inhibition took effect.
C. DISCUSSION
Until this case, it had been generally assumed that the answer to the question “can
you conclude missives by fax or pdf?” was either yes or no. The “it depends” approach
is a new development.
The two passages quoted above are not easy to reconcile. The first speaks of “a
specific agreement between the particular solicitors”. But the second seems to say
that mutual intention is not necessary: all that is needed is a unilateral statement. But
both passages presuppose that some form of delivery is needed.
The law about methods of delivery has developed mainly in connection with goods
rather than documents, but with goods there can in theory be constructive delivery
through a “possessory agreement” (constitutum possessorium) in which both sides
agree that the goods, though still in the hands of the transferor, are to be regarded
as being held on behalf of the transferee.13 But this requires the agreement of both
parties. It may be added that the courts have traditionally been reluctant to accept
possessory agreements as being valid. In short, constructive delivery on the basis
of a unilateral statement is of doubtful competence, and even if there is mutual
agreement its effect seems uncertain. If constructive delivery of this type is possible,
then logically it should not be necessary to send the fax or pdf at all. For if one side
holds the wet-signed paper on behalf of the other side, that is all that is needed. The
whole thing could be done by phone.
So what is the law? I do not know. Park, Ptrs does not settle it. The ratio is arguable,
and the remarks about constructive delivery may be obiter dicta. The case does not
distinguish between “delivery by image” and “delivery by agreement”.
D. LAW REFORM?
“Electronic missives” can mean two things. It can mean missives by fax or pdf.
In that case, there is still paper and ink. Here the missives are not electronic,
12 Ibid.
13 For the whole subject see W M Gordon, Studies in the Transfer of Property by Traditio (1970);
K G C Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) para 623 (W M Gordon); D L Carey Miller
with D Irvine, Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law, 2nd edn (2005) ch 8.
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but the delivery is. Or it can mean pure e-missives, i.e. electronic documents with
electronic signatures. No paper, no ink. Seemingly the profession wants e-missives,14
though the distinction between the two types is not always recognised. The Scottish
Law Commission has recommended that the 1995 Act be amended to allow pure
e-missives,15 and there could also be secondary legislation under section 8 of the
Electronic Communications Act 2000. One way or another, legislation seems likely.16
George L Gretton
University of Edinburgh
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Actionable Rights and Wrongs: Human Rights
Challenges in AXA General Insurance Ltd
Lord Emslie’s recent opinion in AXA General Insurance Ltd, Ptrs1 comprises 249
paragraphs of thoughtful and well-reasoned argument on the lawfulness of the
Damages (Asbestos-Related Conditions) (Scotland) Act 2009. The decision contains
useful guidance on a number of issues including the parameters of victim status in
terms of article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the extent to
which Acts of the Scottish Parliament, as a sui generis form of subordinate legislation,
are open to judicial review. This note will focus on the two substantive human rights
challenges to the legislation’s competency, made under article 6 and article 1 of the
first protocol to the ECHR. Lord Emslie dismissed each of these challenges, and the
petition as a whole. The petitioners have, however, indicated an intention to appeal.2
A. BACKGROUND
Pleural plaques are scarring to the lung tissue caused by inhalation of asbestos fibres.
They are almost invariably asymptomatic and do not trigger or develop into more
14 See eg J Ley, “Law out of step?” (2009) 54 JLSS Oct/56; E Sinclair, “Never waste a good crisis” (2009) 54
JLSS Nov/56; E Sinclair, “E-missives: it’s time for delivery” (2009) 77 SLG 114; A Duncan, “Concluding
missives in 2009? On your bike” (2009) 103 Greens Property Law Bulletin 5.
15 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Land Registration (Scot Law Com No 222 (2010), available at
www.scotlawcom.gov.uk) para 34.
16 This note draws on material which appears in K G C Reid and G L Gretton, Conveyancing 2009 (2010)
85-89.
1 [2010] CSOH 2, 2010 SLT 179.
2 See Association of British Insurers, “News release: insurers lodge appeal against Scottish
judgment on pleural plaques” 14 Jan 2010, available at http://www.abi.org.uk/Media/Releases/
2010/01/Insurers_lodge_appeal_against_Scottish_judgment_on_pleural_plaques.aspx.
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serious asbestos-related conditions such as mesothelioma. Diagnosis of plaques does,
however, confirm exposure to asbestos, indicating an elevated risk of development of
such conditions, which may be grounds for significant anxiety. Over several decades,
UK indemnity insurers of employers who negligently exposed workers to asbestos
have settled personal injury claims in respect of plaques. Insurers adopted this policy
on the basis of a “commercial decision”3 rather than as the result of any clear authority
as to the legal basis on which plaques might found a claim.4
The position changed two years ago. In Rothwell v Chemical and Insulating Co
Limited,5 a conjoined group of English test cases, the House of Lords unanimously
affirmed the majority decision of the Court of Appeal in finding that pleural plaques
could not form the basis of a damages action. Scarring which did not cause disability,
disfigurement, or the risk of development into a more serious condition could not,
it was held, amount to a harm for the purposes of the law of tort.6 The Scottish
Parliament responded to this decision with the 2009 legislation, which provides that
pleural plaques, along with pleural thickening and asbestosis, are to be considered as
actionable harms. The petitioners in AXA General Insurance, a group of insurance
companies, argued that this Act had the effect of unlawfully imposing millions of
pounds of additional liabilities upon them.
B. THE ARTICLE 6 CHALLENGE
Article 6 of the ECHR begins: “In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations. . . everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing”. The contention put
forward by the petitioners was that the 2009 legislation represented an unjustifiable
Parliamentary interference in the determination of the petitioners’ civil rights and
obligations. The scope of this challenge was admitted to be restricted to the several
hundred pleural plaques claims which had been sisted since 2006 pending the
decision in Rothwell. The 2009 Act, it was asserted, directly interfered in the outcome
of these cases. It was additionally contended that this interference would operate to
“‘reconfigure’ past indemnity insurance contracts in such a way as to impose new
liabilities for which premiums were never taken”.7
The background to this challenge was in the nature of a debate between the
parties as to the true purpose of the 2009 legislation. The petitioners’ position was
essentially that Rothwell had been acknowledged by Holyrood as fatal to existing
plaques claims, and the Act had been introduced specifically to prevent that result,
deliberately targeting insurers. The argument for the Scottish government was that
the legislation was designed to resolve uncertainty as to the applicability of Rothwell,
3 Paras 9 and 10.
4 See in England, Sykes v Ministry of Defence, The Times 23 Mar 1984, and in Scotland, Gibson v
McAndrew Wormald & Co Ltd 1998 SLT 562. Neither case turned on this point, however.
5 [2008] 1 AC 281.
6 Lord Hope differed from the other judges in concluding that plaques might be recognised as an injury
or a disease, but since no symptoms resulted, they must be considered de minimis. See paras 38 and 39.
7 AXA General Insurance at para 148.
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a case decided under principles of English law, in Scotland and to give effect to the
legal and political view that pleural plaques should be an actionable wrong.
Lord Emslie concluded from the Strasbourg authorities8 that a successful
challenge required the petitioners to demonstrate:9
(i) that the close involvement which they claimed in pleural plaques litigation should be
held equivalent to party status; (ii) that the outcome of pleural plaques actions should
be deemed decisive for their own civil rights and obligations as indemnity insurers; and
(iii) that the 2009 Act relevantly interfered with judicial determination of such proceedings.
The petitioners were unsuccessful in every element. Two key difficulties emerged.
The first was that, regardless of the extent to which the resolution of the sisted cases
might impact on insurers’ finances, nothing determinative of their own civil rights and
obligations could result. It seems that the “reconfiguration of policies” argument may
have been intended to meet the criterion of direct determination, but Lord Emslie
noted that, like the petitioners (and the writer), he did not find this contention easy to
follow.10 Either the policies covered actionable damage or they did not, and nothing in
the legislation could rewrite the terms of those contracts. Secondly, Lord Emslie was
not satisfied that the 2009 Act was designed to influence directly the determination
of the sisted cases. The purpose of the legislation, on the evidence, was to ensure that
individuals diagnosed with pleural plaques, pleural thickening or asbestosis, whether
in the past or the future, would have an actionable basis for a claim in Scots law.
The retrospective effect of the legislation on the sisted cases was a secondary issue.
It is difficult to imagine an alternative outcome to this challenge when the
nature of the dispute between insurers and the Government is set alongside the
authorities in the area.11 Article 6 cannot operate to prevent a state from introducing
legislation which may impact on ongoing litigation, for, if it did, legislating would be
an impossible task. The cases where a challenge of this kind has found favour almost
inevitably involve existing litigation between the applicant and the state itself in which
the state has used legislation purely and specifically to evade an otherwise inevitable
defeat.12 Although Lord Emslie, probably correctly, placed little significance on the
fact the government was not party to the sisted cases,13 the reality remains that the
battle between the government and insurers here is one of broad legal and political
principle. Indeed, the fact that so many ongoing actions existed in the first place
tends to support rather than undermine this conclusion. The legislation itself provides
8 Although various cases were canvassed, Zielinski and Ors v France (2001) 31 EHRR 19 was clearly the
most influential.
9 AXA General Insurance at para 164.
10 Para 243.
11 The numerous cases referred to by the parties are listed at para 147. Al-Fayed v United Kingdom (1994)
18 EHRR 393 and Perez v France (2005) 40 EHRR 39 are also of interest in this context.
12 The exceptions are App No 16043/03 Achache v France 3 Oct 2006 and App No 67847/01 Lecarpentier
v France 14 Feb 2006. The applicants in these cases were engaged in litigation with quasi-nationalised
French banks, where the virtual party status of the state was easier to make out than in the sisted
plaques actions, although the principle may be of wider application.
13 AXA General Insurance at para 169.
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baldly that plaques, pleural thickening and asbestosis are actionable in Scotland, with
no clarifications or restrictions. The point is of wide social and legal significance. An
attempt to view it solely through the prism of article 6 could only ever be an artificial
construction of the argument, and is evidently not what rights under article 6 were
designed for.
C. THE CHALLENGE UNDER ARTICLE 1 PROTOCOL 1
Article 1 protocol 1 protects the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. This right
can be interfered with by the state where necessary in the public interest, provided
the state action is lawful and proportionate. Two main issues arose in respect of
this challenge. In the first place, what was the nature of the “possession” which the
petitioners alleged was entitled to protection? Secondly, had peaceful enjoyment of
this possession in fact been interfered with by the introduction of the 2009 Act? The
court also considered whether the interference, if any, could be justified on public
interest grounds.
(1) Possessions
Contentious under this head was the petitioners’ submission that the Rothwell
decision was, in itself, an asset of value to insurers. Rothwell, it was argued,
constituted an immunity from pleural plaques claims. Strasbourg jurisprudence, it
was said, indicates that a reasonably-based claim carrying a legitimate expectation of
success is a “possession” within the meaning of article 1 protocol 1. Why, then, should
an immunity carrying a significant economic value not also be considered a possession
in the article 1 protocol 1 sense?14
It is an established principle of ECHR jurisprudence that “possessions” has an
autonomous meaning.15 Although the guidance offered by the case law on the exact
parameters of what may constitute a possession is far from conclusive, it is possible
to identify certain key factors. Thus the purported possession must have an economic
value; and it must have been acquired by the time of the state action, or there must
have been a legitimate expectation of future acquisition which was prevented by state
action.16 Within this framework, it is clear that a court order is a possession, effectively
equivalent to a debt.17 The position of as yet unresolved court actions is somewhat
unclear. The general line is that an ongoing action cannot be a possession: hence
dismissal of an action by the courts is not in itself interference with a possession.18
14 Para 181.
15 App No 33202/96 Beyeler v Italy 5 Jan 2000, accepted domestically in e.g.Wilson v First County Trust
(No 2) [2004] 1 AC 816.
16 The authorities are legion, but assistance may be found in Inze v Austria (1988) 10 EHRR 394; Van
Marle v Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 483; Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v Sweden (1991) 13 EHRR 309;
and domestically in Adams v Scottish Ministers 2004 SC 665 and Catscratch Limited v City of Glasgow
Licensing Board (No 2) 2002 SLT 503.
17 A recent example is Broniowski v Poland (2006) 43 EHRR 1.
18 Agneessens v Belgium (1988) 58 DR 74; Kopécky v Slovakia (2005) 41 EHRR 43.
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A few exceptions do exist for ongoing claims, but these tend to involve the state as a
party to the litigation in circumstances similar to the article 6 cases discussed above.19
Within this context, Lord Emslie identified a number of difficulties with the
assertion that Rothwell equated to a possession. Chiefly, the decision did not offer
the immunity petitioners claimed. The case was decided under English law, and
whether the same conclusion would be reached using Scots principles was at least
debatable. The agreed evidence in Rothwell might not be replicated in future cases.
The appellate committee had specifically not ruled on the likely success of potential
future contract-based plaques claims. Finally, the decision dealt only with plaques,
not with the pleural thickening or asbestosis which were also identified as actionable
damage by the 2009 Act. Given all the imponderables, it would be inaccurate to
describe Rothwell as representing immunity from future claims which had been
removed by the 2009 legislation. Such immunity had never existed.
More critically, immunity in itself could never amount to a possession. Lord Emslie
noted that “possession” is not wide enough to cover every interest which has an
economic value: the interest has to be proprietary in nature. In other words, the
interest must have been acquired in the sense that property rights can be exercised
in respect of it.20 Immunity from suit cannot be sold, assigned or otherwise disposed
of. Security cannot be granted over it. The idea that immunity might prevent future
impact on the financial standing of insurers is too far removed from the notion of a
proprietary interest to qualify as an article 1 protocol 1 possession.
This interpretation of the Strasbourg case law is undoubtedly correct. Economic
value is not the sole test of possessions, and construing the right in this way would
render it meaningless.21 The importance of proprietary rights has been emphasised
repeatedly both in identifying when a possession is held and in clarifying when the
possession has been lost.22 A claim in which there is a reasonably-based expectation of
success may, uncomfortably, equate to a possession in the Strasbourg jurisprudence.
The expectation of a successful defence to a claim will not.
(2) Interference
The petitioners’ second argument focused on their capital resources, which were
unquestionably a “possession”. The 2009 legislation would have the effect of
compelling insurers to pay damages for pleural plaques claims. This, it was argued,
represented an interference with their capital resources.
As with the article 6 challenge, Lord Emslie was not satisfied that the relationship
between the legislation and the impact on the petitioners’ finances was sufficiently
proximate to engage rights under article 1 protocol 1. “A line has to be drawn”,
19 Stran Greek Refineries v Greece (1995) 19 EHRR 293; Pressos Compania Naviera SA v Belgium (1996)
21 EHRR 301.
20 Anheuser Busch v Portugal (2007) 45 EHRR 36.
21 These ideas are paralleled in a very different context in M v Austria (1984) 39 DR 85.
22 The keynote decision of Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35 is instructive in this
regard.
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he indicated, “between on the one hand, primary and immediate effects and, on
the other, effects which are only secondary and derivative. The ripples spreading
outwards from a legislative measure cannot be thought to confer or infringe legal
rights to an infinite degree”.23
This conclusion seems entirely consistent with the Strasbourg case law. In
Bramelid and Malmström v Sweden,24 the European Commission on Human Rights
explained that article 1 protocol 1 dealt with “the action whereby the State lays
hand – or authorises a third party to lay hands – on a particular piece of property for
a purpose which is to serve the public interest”.25 The 2009 legislation could not
sensibly be said to “authorise” individuals diagnosed with pleural plaques to withdraw
funds from the petitioners’ capital resources. An action must be successfully pursued
before damages would be awarded. The argument is similar to the article 6 challenge
outlined above, and it fails for broadly the same reason.
(3) Public interest
To bring the human rights arguments to a conclusion, and notwithstanding his earlier
findings, Lord Emslie dealt fully with the petitioners’ assertion that any interference
that might be established with their article 1 protocol 1 rights could not be justified in
the public interest. Without rehearsing the arguments in full, some key points might
be highlighted.
It had already been established that the aim of the legislation was much broader
than the petitioners claimed. With that finding in place, many of the arguments
under this head simply fell away. A legitimate aim had evidently been pursued and
insurers had not been targeted. Lord Emslie was understandably unimpressed with
the suggestion that legislating to reverse Rothwell, if the legislation even had that
effect, was outrageous or irrational. The speeches of the appellate committee suggest
that decision was reached with difficulty and by a very slender margin. In summing
up, Lord Emslie notes:26
[A]wards of damages against negligent employers, at appropriate levels and under settled
rules, cannot be thought to constitute an unwarranted or disproportionate end result. If
that is right, alleged regulatory sterilisation of the petitioners’ reserves can in my view be no
better placed . . .
This conclusion seems entirely in keeping with the Strasbourg approach to
proportionality.
D. CONCLUSION
With the clarification offered by Lord Emslie’s findings as to the fundamental purpose
of the 2009 Act, it seems that insurers will have marked difficulty in mounting a
23 Para 196.
24 (1982) 29 DR 76.
25 At 82.
26 AXA General Insurance at para 225.
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successful appeal. Regardless of the ECHR article in question, an effective challenge
must concern clear violation of a person’s rights. If the legislation in question is
designed to clarify a broader point of legal principle, then it is difficult to imagine
how such an individual violation could be found to exist.
Regardless of the view taken on the dismissal of the petition, the judgment is
encouraging in its treatment of the Strasbourg jurisprudence. Both the parties and
the court made thorough and thoughtful use of the authorities in areas where there
has, as yet, been little opportunity for domestic exploration. In that sense, it may be
that the appeal already marked will prove beneficial to us all.
Frankie McCarthy
University of Glasgow
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The Scottish DNA Database and the Criminal
Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Bill
The collection and retention of DNA samples is universally seen as crucial for
purposes of criminal investigation and prosecution, as a means of excluding innocent
suspects and of exonerating the wrongfully convicted. However, there is less
consistency across jurisdictions on the question of whose DNA should be obtained
by the state and for how long it should be stored. In Scotland, DNA samples may
at present be obtained from anyone arrested, and then retained indefinitely after
conviction in the criminal courts or for limited periods following acquittal for certain
serious offences. The Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Bill, currently before
the Scottish Parliament,1 proposes to extend this to allow retention of DNA data
obtained from children who have committed sexual or violent offences and who are
being dealt with by the children’s hearings system. The Bill also articulates explicitly
the permitted uses of retained DNA data.
A. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN SCOTLAND
The existing law relating to DNA collection, retention, use and destruction is
contained in sections 18-20 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.2 Section
18 permits the collection of bodily samples, from which DNA profiles may be
1 The Bill was introduced on 5 March 2009 and passed Stage 1 on 26 November 2009. For
details of progress, and the text of the Bill, see http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/s3/bills/24-
CrimJustLc/index.htm.
2 As amended by the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 and the Police, Public Order and Criminal
Justice (Scotland) Act 2006.
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gathered, when a person has been arrested and is in custody or detained. Reasonable
force may be used for the purpose of collection.3 Although section 18(3) outlines a
general rule of destruction of samples following a decision not to institute criminal
proceedings or when proceedings do not end with conviction, retention is permitted
after conviction, and also after prosecution for certain sexual or violent offences even
if no conviction follows.4 In the latter instance indefinite retention is not allowed
per se: according to section 18A(4) the destruction date is three years following
conclusion of proceedings. However, section 18A(5) permits further extension by a
sheriff, on application by a relevant chief constable, for no more than two years.
Nothing prevents recurring police applications to amend further the destruction date.
The relevant provisions in the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Bill do
not change this scheme of DNA collection and retention from acquitted individuals.
This is in line with the recommendations in the Fraser Report on Acquisition and
Retention of DNA and Fingerprint Data in Scotland5 and the subsequent Scottish
Government proposals.6 However, the Fraser Report did propose a power to take
and retain DNA samples from children who are dealt with by the children’s hearings
system for certain serious offences.7 This will be implemented by section 59 of
the Bill,8 which permits retention of samples from children referred to a children’s
hearing for sexual or violent offences for a three-year period with the possibility of
extensions for two-year blocks. The child (and his or her parent or guardian) must
accept the ground of referral, or a sheriff must find it to be established.
Furthermore, section 60 of the Bill specifies that any data or samples obtained may
be used for the prevention or detection of crime, the investigation of an offence or
the conduct of a prosecution, or for the identification of a person, deceased or alive.
In this context crime refers to conduct which is an offence within or outside the UK,
and the reference to investigations and prosecutions includes those occurring outside
the UK.
B. THE BROADER CONTEXT
The proposed changes to DNA collection and retention in Scotland cannot be
assessed without consideration of the decision of the European Court of Human
Rights in S and Marper v United Kingdom,9 which found the equivalent law in
England andWales to be in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. In
that jurisdiction, DNA is collected from convicted individuals and arrestees, whether
adult or child, for all recordable offences. Moreover, such samples are retained
3 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s 19B.
4 Section 18A. The relevant offences are listed in s 19A6.
5 J Fraser, Acquisition and Retention of DNA and Fingerprint Data in Scotland (2008, available at
http://www.sipr.ac.uk/downloads/Fraser_DNA_Report.pdf).
6 Scottish Government,Acquisition and Retention of DNA and Fingerprint Data in Scotland: Consultation
Report (2009) para 18.
7 Fraser, Acquisition and Retention of DNA and Fingerprint Data (n 5) 19.
8 Inserting ss 18B and 18C into the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
9 (2009) 48 EHRR 50.
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indefinitely.10 The “blanket and indiscriminate” retention of DNA profiles, the lack
of a time limit for retention, and the limited opportunities for removal of data were
found to interfere disproportionately with article 8 (the right to respect for private and
family life).11 Notably, the Grand Chamber explicitly mentioned the existing Scottish
measures as a preferable and more moderate and proportionate approach.12
C. COMMENTARY
Although the Scottish Government is to be praised for not seeking to increase the
DNA retention periods for persons acquitted after prosecution in the criminal justice
system, the proposed changes in the Bill concerning children are disproportionate
and may affect the essential ethos of the children’s hearing system as a whole.
Furthermore, the Bill represents a missed opportunity to address problems regarding
repeated extensions, the sharing of data with other jurisdictions with more
expansive schemes, and the destruction of samples after DNA profiles have been
extracted.
The Bill will allow collection of a sample from a child, using reasonable force if
necessary, and the holding of such data. Retention of a minor’s DNA after conviction
is not in breach of the ECHR.13 However, in S and Marper the Grand Chamber
noted “the risk of stigmatisation” in treating persons who have not been convicted
in the same way as convicted persons.14 As the children’s hearing system, when
dealing with offence grounds for referral, does not determine a criminal charge,
children involved in this process have not been convicted and do not enjoy full article
6 rights.15 Yet the retention of their data essentially equates them with convicted
criminals and seems a dishonest means of drawing children into the criminal justice
system and crime control mechanisms of the state. Although the proposed time
period echoes that for suspects rather than convicted persons, a period of three
years plus is unduly lengthy in relation to young people. Indeed in S and Marper
the court noted that that the retention of unconvicted persons’ data may be especially
harmful in the case of minors “given their special situation and the importance of
their development and integration in society”.16 The inclusion of children’s DNA in
the database, even for a limited period, may lead to stigmatisation and to the labelling
of the child as a criminal, which conflicts with the welfare principle articulated in
section 16 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995. While the paramountcy accorded to
welfare can be overridden to protect the public from serious harm,17 the retention
10 Criminal Justice Act 2003 pt 1.
11 As a result, English law is being reassessed regarding the requisite degree of seriousness of the
“qualifying” offence, the appropriate treatment of minors, and the duration of retention (see Home
Office, Keeping The Right People On The DNA Database (2009)). See now the Crime and Security Bill,
which was introduced into Parliament while this note was in press.
12 S and Marper at paras 109-110.
13 App No 20689/08 W v The Netherlands, 20 Jan 2009.
14 S and Marper at para 122.
15 S v Miller 2001 SC 977.
16 S and Marper at para 124.
17 Children (Scotland) Act 1995 s 16(5).
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of DNA seems like an indirect and dubious means of achieving this. Moreover,
as more serious alleged offences by children are dealt with through the criminal
courts,18 it is curious that the Bill will extend the scope of the database to encompass
children who have committed serious offences but who are sought to be dealt with
in a measured and holistic way in the children’s hearing system. In essence, the
measures relating to children appear disproportionate, and may alter the nature of
children’s hearings by suggesting a closer nexus between their work and that of the
criminal courts.
A further problematic aspect of section 59 concerns the breadth of offences
involved, which include rape, murder, culpable homicide, fire raising, assault and
reckless conduct causing actual injury.While the Government’s response to the Fraser
Report indicated that less serious assaults should not result in DNA sampling and
retention in line with adults,19 this proviso is not in the Bill. Finally, DNA retention
may be premised on the child’s admission of the relevant behaviour rather than
necessarily requiring determination by a sheriff. Given the Scottish requirement of
corroboration for confessions in the criminal context,20 inclusion on the database
based on personal admission alone seems an aberration.
In addition, the Bill fails to restrict repeated requests for two-year extensions.
Section 18A has only been in force since 2007, and so the need for such
extensions has yet to arise. However, repeated extensions which would render the
retention de facto indefinite would be inconsistent with the judgment in S and
Marper, and so a provision to this effect is desirable. Moreover, the Bill does
not preclude use in Scotland of data retained from acquitted individuals under
the existing English scheme.21 Though Scotland has its own DNA database, the
included profiles are duplicated on the UK-wide National DNA Database, and
thus samples may be checked against persons in England and Wales who have
not been convicted and whose DNA is held indefinitely. As Johnson and Williams
previously noted, this represents an imbalance in the material to which police
forces across the UK have access.22 More significantly, however, it means that
Scotland’s ostensibly principled scheme which is protective of human rights may
be tarnished somewhat by the fact that police forces may avail themselves of
the wider retention process in England and Wales. Furthermore, no distinction
is made in the Bill between DNA samples and DNA profiles which are gleaned
18 Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, Lord Advocate’s Direction to Chief Constables: Reporting
to Procurator Fiscals of Offences Alleged to Have Been Committed By Children (2004) category 1
(available at http://www.copfs.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/13425/0000138.pdf).
19 Scottish Government, Fraser Report on Retention of DNA and Fingerprint Data – Government’s
Response (2008) 17.
20 See e.g. Armit v O’Donnell 1999 JC 289.
21 Indeed the text of Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 “on the stepping up of cross-border
cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime” requires member states to
allow others access to reference data in their DNA analysis files.
22 P Johnson and R Williams, “DNA and criminal investigation: Scotland and the ‘UK National DNA
Database”’ (2004) 10 Scottish Journal of Criminal Justice Studies 71.
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from samples.23 Genewatch, in a written submission to the Justice Committee,
argued that samples should be destroyed once DNA profiles have been obtained
and inserted on to the DNA database because it is only the profile that is necessary
for the purposes of future identification.24 Retention of samples holds a heightened
risk of abuse given the sensitive nature of genetic material, but the Scottish
Government states that retention of full samples is preferable, for purposes of
verification of the original profile, quality control, or the extraction of a more detailed
profile.25
Finally, it is noteworthy that the Government’s consultation paper also invited
views on the fate of DNA data where an alleged offender accepts a direct
measure, such as a fiscal fine. At the moment, DNA data obtained from such a
person is destroyed. Various police associations expressed support for indefinite
retention, while some support was also evident for a scheme mirroring the
time frames applicable to persons charged with, but acquitted of, certain sexual
or violent offences.26 The Justice Committee was “less certain” about such an
extension, on grounds of proportionality, consistency, and practicality.27 The Bill
does not address this issue, although the Scottish Government continues to
consider it.28
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS
While section 59 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Bill unjustifiably
expands the categories of people whose DNA may be retained and in doing so
potentially transgresses human rights principles and the core ethos of the children’s
hearing, the other measures in the Bill merely put on a clearer statutory footing
powers that are currently enjoyed and exercised by the police. Scotland still
maintains a more stringent process for inclusion on the DNA database, when
contrasted with the situation south of the Border. This cautious approach should be
preserved.
Liz Campbell
University of Aberdeen
23 A DNA profile usually is understood as a set of identification characteristics from regions of DNA that
are not known to provide for any physical characteristics or medical conditions of the person.
24 Scottish Parliament Justice Committee, Stage 1 Report on the Criminal Justice and Licensing
(Scotland) Bill (2009, available at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/s3/committees/justice/reports-
09/jur09-18-01.htm) para 355.
25 Scottish Government, Consultation Report (n 6) para 41.
26 See A above.
27 Justice Committee, Stage 1 Report on the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Bill (n 24) para
372.
28 Scottish Government, “News Release: strengthening Scotland’s forensic regime”, 24 Feb 2009.
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Assisted Suicide: Jurisdiction and Discretion
The facts of R (Purdy) v DPP,1 the final decision of the House of Lords concerning
the criminal law,2 have received considerable public attention. Ms Purdy suffers from
primary progressive multiple sclerosis, and further deterioration in her condition is
inevitable. She envisages, at some future point, ending her life by travelling to a
country (perhaps Switzerland) where assisted suicide is lawful. Her husband, Mr
Puente, is prepared to assist her in this journey, but both he and Ms Purdy are
concerned that this would render him liable to prosecution for aiding, abetting,
counselling or procuring suicide under section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961. Ms Purdy
therefore asked the Director of Public Prosecutions to “promulgate and/or disclose
his policy in relation to the circumstances in which he will consent (or not consent) to
a prosecution”3 for the section 2(1) offence.4 The DPP refused to do this, asserting
that “any such policy –which would amount to a proleptic grant of immunity –would
be unlawful”.5 Ms Purdy’s application for judicial review, and subsequent appeal,
failed. In the House of Lords, however, she succeeded.
A. WOULD THERE BE ANY OFFENCE TO PROSECUTE?
The first point which the House considered – one which had not been argued in the
courts below –was whether there was in fact any offence for which Mr Puente could
be prosecuted were he to take the actions envisaged. Subsequent to the Court of
Appeal’s decision, two different arguments appeared in the academic literature to
the effect that there might be no crime committed by Mr Puente which would be
prosecutable in the English courts. One of these was, in part, addressed by their
Lordships; the other was not.
The point which was addressed was that made by Michael Hirst,6 who argued
that if a suicide took place in Switzerland – beyond the jurisdiction of the English
courts – then it would not be possible to prosecute any individual for being, in
England, complicit in that suicide. This new argument was rejected, but only
tentatively. As Lord Hope of Craighead observed, the offence under section 2(1) is
1 [2009] UKHL 45, [2009] 3 WLR 403.
2 But, as an action for judicial review, not the last criminal appeal to come before the House: that case is R
v Cooper [2009] UKHL 42, [2009] 1 WLR 1786. See G Maher, “Rape and other things: sexual offences
and people with mental disorder” (2010) 14 EdinLR 129.
3 R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] EWCA Civ 92, [2009] 1 Cr App R 32 at para 12.
4 Any prosecution for the offence must be by or with the consent of the DPP: Suicide Act 1961 s 2(4).
5 See Purdy [2009] EWCA Civ 92 at para 12.
6 M Hirst, “Suicide in Switzerland: complicity in England?” [2009] Crim LR 335.
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an offence in itself, rather than being ancillary to another crime.7 Furthermore, he
argued:8
Its application cannot be avoided by arranging for the final act of suicide to be performed
on the high seas, for example, or in Scotland. Otherwise it would be all too easy to exclude
the vulnerable or the easily led from its protection.
While attractive at first glance, this argument is unconvincing. Recourse to the high
seas would be unlikely to avoid the application of the 1961 Act, because of the
broad statutory provisions which allow English courts, within certain limits, to take
cognisance of acts committed there as if they had taken place within ordinary English
jurisdiction.9 Arranging for the final act to take place in Scotland would be an even
less attractive option, as it would most likely render the individual concerned liable to
prosecution before the High Court of Justiciary for murder.10 It is of course true that
if the parties concerned could identify a jurisdiction where assisted suicide was lawful,
and arranged for the final act to take place there, then Professor Hirst’s argument
would entail that no criminal liability attached. That seems, however, to be the very
essence of his position and not a counter-argument.
The other reason for rejecting Professor Hirst’s argument was that the basis of
jurisdiction in English law in cases of complicity is not, as he argued, “terminatory”.
Instead, jurisdiction could be asserted on the basis that the English courts are entitled
“to assume jurisdiction to try an offence if a substantial part of it took place within the
jurisdiction, provided that there [is] no reason of international comity why the court
should not do so”.11 Surely, however, the fact that the jurisdiction where the suicide
occurred does not regard such acts as a criminal offence would be an extremely strong
reason of “international comity” for declining to apply English criminal law, in the
absence of Parliament having legislated for nationality-based jurisdiction?
These were not the only arguments for holding that the section 2(1) offence could
be applied to circumstances such as those envisaged by Ms Purdy and Mr Puente.
A full discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this note, and it is sufficient for
present purposes to mention that Professor Hirst’s position commands rather more
weight than the speeches in Purdy suggest. For their Lordships’ part, the key point
7 Para 18.
8 Para 18. See also para 23.
9 Merchant Shipping Act 1995 s 281, when read with the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 s 3A and the
Senior Courts Act 1981 s 46A. See e.g. R v Kelly [1982] AC 665 (applying the predecessor provisions of
the Merchant Shipping Act 1894), holding that two British subjects who were passengers on a Danish
ship could be prosecuted in the English courts for committing criminal damage on that ship while it was
on the high seas. On the complexities of the statutory provisions, see MHirst, Jurisdiction and the Ambit
of the Criminal Law (2003) 291-296.
10 See generally P R Ferguson, “Killing ‘without getting into trouble’? Assisted suicide and Scots criminal
law” (1998) 2 EdinLR 288.
11 Para 22 per Lord Hope of Craighead, citing R v Smith (Wallace Duncan) (No 4) [2004] QB 1418.
Lord Hope’s language is subtly different from that found in Smith (Wallace Duncan), where the court
refers – quoting Rose LJ in R v Smith (Wallace Duncan) [1996] 2 Cr App R 1 – to activities which should
“on the basis of international comity, be dealt with by another country” (para 55, emphasis added). The
shift in language would seem to support the argument made in the text.
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was that the applicability of section 2(1) was arguable. If it was arguable, there was a
risk of prosecution, and if there was a risk of prosecution, it was necessary to consider
Ms Purdy’s principal argument.
The academic argument which the House did not address was that made by J K
Mason, who suggested in this journal that a solution to the dilemma posed in Purdy
was to recognise that Mr Puente would not be assisting in suicide but simply in travel
arrangements.12 Given the approach taken by their Lordships to Professor Hirst’s
position, however, the problem of arguability would again seem to preclude resolving
the issue in this way.
B. THE DISCRETION TO PROSECUTE
Their Lordships proceeded, therefore, to consider whether the DPP was required to
promulgate the policy which Ms Purdy had requested. They concluded, first of all,
that insofar as the law restricted Ms Purdy’s ability to choose how she might end her
life – and might, indeed, constrain her to do so at an earlier stage while she was able
to do this without Mr Puente’s assistance – this could amount to an interference with
her right to respect for private life under article 8(1) of the European Convention on
Human Rights.13 Any interference would therefore – by virtue of article 8(2) – have to
be in accordance with the law. Reviewing the Strasbourg jurisprudence, Lord Hope
concluded that this requirement:14
. . . implies qualitative requirements, including those of accessibility and foreseeability.
Accessibility means that an individual must know from the wording of the relevant provision
and, if need be, with the assistance of the court’s interpretation of it what acts and omissions
will make him criminally liable. . . The requirement of foreseeability will be satisfied where
the person concerned is able to foresee, if need be with appropriate legal advice, the
consequences which a given action may entail. A law which confers a discretion is not
in itself inconsistent with this requirement, provided the scope of the discretion and the
manner of its exercise are indicated with sufficient clarity to give the individual protection
against interference which is arbitrary. . .
This requirement is in most cases met by the Code for Crown Prosecutors,15 which
will “normally provide sufficient guidance to Crown Prosecutors and to the public
as to how [prosecutorial] decisions should or are likely to be taken”.16 However, the
Code had demonstrably failed in this respect when the DPP had taken the decision
12 J K Mason, “Unalike as two peas? R (on the application of Purdy) v DPP” (2008) 13 EdinLR 298.
13 This involved a departure from the view taken in R (Pretty) v DPP [2002] 1 AC 800 in favour of that
expressed by the European Court of Human Rights in Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1 at
para 67. In any event, as Lord Hope explained (at para 38), the factual differences between the cases
meant that there were compelling reasons for holding that article 8(1) was engaged in Ms Purdy’s case
even if it had not been in Ms Pretty’s.
14 Para 41.
15 Crown Prosecution Service, The Code for Crown Prosecutors (2004).
16 Para 54.
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not to bring any prosecution in the case of Daniel James, a 23-year-old man who
suffered from tetraplegia as the result of a serious spinal injury in a rugby accident
and ended his life at a Swiss clinic. The DPP concluded that there was sufficient
evidence to prosecute James’s parents and a family friend under the 1961 Act, but
that a prosecution would not be in the public interest. In reaching that decision, he
said:17
I consider that the offence of aiding and abetting the suicide of another under section 2(1)
Suicide Act 1961 is unique in that the critical act – suicide – is not itself unlawful, unlike any
other aiding and abetting offence. For that reason, I have decided that many of the factors
identified in the Code in favour or against a prosecution do not really apply in this case. . .
It followed from this “commendably frank analysis”18 that the Code was insufficient
to meet the requirements of article 8(2) of the ECHR, with the result that the DPP
should be required to “promulgate an offence-specific policy identifying the facts and
circumstances” to be taken into account in deciding whether or not to consent to a
prosecution under section 2 of the 1961 Act.
Such a policy has now been published.19 In the immediate aftermath of the House
of Lords’ decision, the Lord Advocate indicated reluctance to take any similar course
of action in Scotland, emphasising that Purdy was an “English case” dealing with an
“offence [which] does not apply in Scotland” and asserting that “any change in the
current law related to homicide is properly a matter for the Scottish Parliament”.20 Is
this stance justifiable?
C. THE SCOTTISH POSITION
It is sometimes asserted that suicide simply is not a crime in Scotland,21 in contrast to
the pre-1961 English position. In fact, the distinction between the two jurisdictions
seems more a consequence of ancillary rules than a difference in substantive criminal
law. The older Scottish writers do regard suicide as criminal in nature,22 but with little
or no scope for such an act to be recognised as criminally punishable.23 In England,
17 K Starmer, “Decision on prosecution – the death by suicide of Daniel James”, 9 Dec 2008, para 29
(available atwww.cps.gov.uk/news/articles/death_by_suicide_of_daniel_james/). See also Purdy at para
49 per Lord Hope of Craighead.
18 Para 50 per Lord Hope of Craighead.
19 Crown Prosecution Service, Policy for Prosecutors in respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting
Suicide (2010), available at www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide.html.
20 The Lord Advocate’s statement is reproduced at (2010) 14 EdinLR 12. See also S A M McLean, C
Connelly and J K Mason, “Purdy in Scotland: we hear, but should we listen?” 2009 JR 265.
21 See e.g. R A A McCall Smith and D Sheldon, Scots Criminal Law, 2nd edn (1997) 171; McLean,
Connelly and Mason (n 20) at 276.
22 G Mackenzie, The Laws and Customes of Scotland, in Matters Criminal (1678) 1.13; Erskine, Inst
4.4.46 (“as truly criminal as the murder of one’s neighbour”); Hume, Commentaries i, 300.
23 See e.g. A M Anderson, The Criminal Law of Scotland, 2nd edn (1904) 148: suicide “is a crime, but it
is one as to which it is impossible to visit the principal with punishment”.
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by contrast, the forfeiture of a suicide’s goods and chattels,24 in conjunction with the
system of coroner’s courts, gave practical application to the theory that suicide was a
felony: the point was “argued backwards” from forfeiture to criminality.25
It might be objected that if suicide were considered a criminal offence in Scots law,
then this should have been evidenced by way of prosecutions for attempted suicide.
The absence of such prosecutions, however, seems to have had more to do with the
lack of any general theory of attempts in Scots law prior to 1887.26 Although there is
now a general rule that any attempt to commit a crime is itself criminal,27 it seems
that attempted suicide has not in practice been treated as a crime per se in Scots law,
no doubt because if a prosecution were felt necessary resort might be made to the
offence of breach of the peace.28
In any event, this is of little relevance to the problem raised in Purdy, as the
modern Scottish position is in practice not very different from the pre-1961 English
position:29 an accessory to suicide may be guilty of murder.30 Were Ms Purdy and
Mr Puente Scottish residents, they would therefore face an even more unpalatable
risk than Mr Puente’s potential prosecution for complicity in suicide: a potential
prosecution for murder.
This brings out the principal oddity in the Lord Advocate’s stance, which seems to
be that the applicability of Purdy in Scotland can be doubted because the statutory
offence in question does not apply north of the Border. But it surely cannot be the
case that because the potential consequences for an individual are more severe in
Scotland than under English law, the case for prosecutorial guidelines is weakened.
It is true that the DPP, in his decision on the Daniel James case, laid weight on
the peculiarity of the offence under section 2 of the 1961 Act. It would be wrong,
however, to elevate form over substance in this respect. In effect, the position
regarding the “critical act” of suicide is little different in Scotland from England,
given that suicide itself cannot and does not result in prosecution.
24 Abolished by the Forfeiture Act 1870. Hume (Commentaries i, 300) noted that “some authorities”
supported the proposition that forfeiture was available in cases of suicide under Scots law. It would,
however, have required positive action on the part of the Crown by way of an action before the Court
of Session, and its practical significance seems unclear. Anderson,Criminal Law (n 23) refers (at 148) to
the corpse of a suicide having been “in former times, subjected to indignities” but makes no mention of
forfeiture. See also R A Houston, Madness and Society in Eighteenth-Century Scotland (2000) 71-72.
25 T F T Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, 5th edn (1956) 445. See also N St John-Stevas,
Life, Death and the Law (1961) 234.
26 As is clear from the reasoning employed by Erskine, Inst 4.4.46 (discussing Mackenzie, Matters
Criminal (n 22) 1.12.3: the reference should properly be to 1.13.3).
27 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s 294, which derives ultimately from s 61 of the Criminal
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1887.
28 See J Morren, Criminal Procedure and Law of Evidence in Scotland (1928) 141; M G A Christie,
Breach of the Peace (1990) para 3.33. The scope of such prosecutions would now be subject to the
“public element” requirement articulated in Harris v HM Advocate [2009] HCJAC 80, 2009 SLT
1078. Although attempted suicide was a criminal offence under English law prior to the Suicide Act
1961, prosecutions were in practice resorted to only where necessary for the accused’s protection, and
proceedings under mental health legislation would now be appropriate in such circumstances: D C
Ormerod, Smith & Hogan: Criminal Law, 12th edn (2008) 554.
29 For a brief overview, see Ormerod, Criminal Law (n 28) 553-554.
30 See generally Ferguson (n 10).
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The question must be approached as one of principle. If guidance as to the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion is required by article 8(2) of the ECHR, then the relevant
source of guidance is that found in the Crown Office Prosecution Code.31 Like the
English Code for Crown Prosecutors, it sets out a list of general public interest
factors to be taken into account both for and against prosecution.32 While a detailed
comparison of the two Codes is outwith the scope of this note, it is fair to say that
they adopt a broadly similar approach in this respect, and it is difficult to see how an
application of the Scottish code in the case of Daniel James would have provided any
more helpful guidance than of which the DPP was able to avail himself.
There is a more interesting general point, of course, which is the extent to which
article 8(2) may require specific prosecutorial guidelines to be issued in other areas.
It seems unlikely that assisted suicide is sui generis to the extent that the general
provisions of the Code for Crown Prosecutors suffice for every offence but that
one.33 That point, however, is for the future. For the meantime, the only relevant
difference between the position in England and Scotland is that the Director of
Public Prosecutions has been obliged by a court order to produce guidelines on the
prosecution of assisted suicide, and the Lord Advocate has not. Given that the order
made by the House of Lords was a consequence of the application of the ECHR, it
should be self-evident that this difference cannot and does not justify the absence of
such guidelines in Scotland.
James Chalmers
University of Edinburgh
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The Right to Legal Advice During Detention:
HM Advocate v McLean
It may come as a surprise to those not well versed in Scottish criminal procedure
that a suspect who has been detained for police questioning has no right to legal
advice during this period. In HM Advocate v McLean,1 the ECHR compatibility of
this position was considered by a Full Bench of seven judges.
31 Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, Prosecution Code (2001) (available at
www.copfs.gov.uk/Publications/2001/05/prosecutioncode).
32 At 6-8.
33 The CPS does, however, publish more detailed guidance on many offences: see www.cps.gov.uk/legal/.
In Scotland, the Crown Office is rather more circumspect, with exceptions: see e.g. the (undated)
“Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service Policy on Causing Death by Driving”, available at
www.copfs.gov.uk/Publications/Driving.
1 [2009] HCJAC 97, 2010 SLT 73.
Vol 14 2010 analysis 301
A. BACKGROUND
In Scots law, a distinction exists between “detention” and “arrest”. A suspect may be
detained for police questioning for up to six hours.2 He does not have the right to have
a solicitor present, although he can have a solicitor informed of his detention.3 Other
than being obliged to give his name and address,4 the suspect has the right to remain
silent. No adverse inferences may be drawn from his silence5 but any answers he does
give can be used in evidence. Once a suspect is arrested and charged, however, any
statements he makes to the police (other than a reply to the charge itself) cannot be
used as evidence6 and he gains the right to a private interview with a solicitor prior to
his first court appearance or judicial examination.7
The ECHR compatibility of leading evidence of admissions made during detention
and in the absence of legal advice had already been unsuccessfully challenged in
Paton v Ritchie,8 but the issue was potentially re-opened by Salduz v Turkey,9 a
decision of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights. In Salduz,
the applicant was convicted of aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation on the
evidence of statements he made in custody without legal advice. The Grand Chamber
held unanimously that article 6(1) had been violated, as it requires that:10
as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation of a suspect
by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of
the case that there are compelling reasons to restrict this right. Even where compelling
reasons may exceptionally justify denial of access to a lawyer, such restriction . . . must not
unduly prejudice the rights of the accused under Article 6. The rights of the defence will
in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during police
interrogation without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction.
In the light of this statement, there was much speculation about the potential
consequences for Scottish criminal practice,11 a question that has now been answered
in McLean.
2 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s 14(2).
3 Section 15(1).
4 And other information necessary to establish identity: s 14(9).
5 Larkin v HM Advocate 2005 SLT 1087.
6 The position is more complex where a suspect has been arrested but not charged, as it was held in
Johnston v HM Advocate 1993 JC 187 that in such circumstances it is possible for the police to continue
to question him and for any answers he provides to be used in evidence, subject to the general test of
fairness. More importantly for present purposes, however, Johnston confirmed that the suspect does gain
the right to legal advice upon arrest, even if he has not been charged (at 195 per the Lord Justice Clerk
(Ross)).
7 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s 17(2).
8 2000 JC 271, endorsed by a Full Bench in Dickson v HM Advocate 2001 JC 203.
9 (2009) 49 EHRR 19.
10 Para 55 (emphasis added).
11 See e.g. P W Ferguson, “The right of access to a lawyer” 2009 SLT (News) 107 at 109-111.
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B. HM ADVOCATE v McLEAN
In McLean, the minuter had been detained in relation to the theft of a motor vehicle
and wilful fire-raising. He had asked that a solicitor be informed of his detention but
did not request legal advice prior to or during the interview and was not offered it. He
made admissions during questioning that the Crown wished to rely on at his trial. A
devolution minute was lodged claiming that the use of these admissions would violate
article 6. In the light of Dickson v HM Advocate,12 the issue was referred to a bench
of seven judges.
In an opinion delivered by the Lord Justice General (Hamilton), the court held
that reliance by the prosecutor on statements obtained in the absence of legal advice
would not automatically render the proceedings unfair and remitted the case for trial.
It offered two alternative lines of argument in support of its decision.
The first was based on its reading of Salduz. The court noted two possible
interpretations of the statement set out above.13 One was that the European Court
intended to lay down an absolute rule that any statements made by the accused in the
absence of legal advice cannot be used in evidence, regardless of any other safeguards
present in the system. Alternatively, the court stated, Salduz could be interpreted to
mean that:14
whether or not there has been a fair trial will depend on the particular circumstances of
the case, including what arrangements the jurisdiction in question has made for access to
legal advice, seen against the guarantees which are otherwise in place in that jurisdiction to
secure a fair trial.
The court chose to favour the second interpretation.15 In doing so, it relied on Judge
Bratza’s concurring opinion in Salduz in which he commented that the principle being
enunciated was “consistent with the court’s earlier case law”.16 In earlier cases,17
the High Court noted, the European Court had not definitively stated that lack of
access to a lawyer would, in itself, render incriminating statements inadmissible and
therefore it had not intended to do so in Salduz.
Having settled on this interpretation of Salduz, the High Court had then to
consider whether Scots law contained sufficient guarantees to ensure a fair trial,
even in the absence of legal advice during detention. The court concluded that it did,
pointing to a number of protections18 including: (1) the caution given to suspects that
they need not answer questions19 but that any answers given may be used as evidence;
(2) the tape-recording of interviews; (3) the inadmissibility of statements obtained
12 2001 JC 203.
13 See text accompanying n 10.
14 McLean at para 24.
15 Para 25.
16 Para 25 of McLean, citing para O-I2 of Salduz.
17 Such as Murray v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 29 and Brennan v United Kingdom (2002) 34
EHRR 18.
18 McLean at para 27.
19 Other than those concerning identity (see n 4).
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through coercion; (4) the corroboration requirement, which ensures that a conviction
cannot be based on a confession alone; (5) the fact that adverse inferences cannot
be drawn at trial from silence during police questioning; (6) the limited duration of
detention (six hours); and (7) the police’s discretion to allow a lawyer to be present
which is “likely to be exercised where the detainee is perceived to be a vulnerable
person”.20
The court’s second line of argument was that, even if the Grand Chamber did
intend to set out an absolute rule that statements made without access to legal
advice are always inadmissible, this principle “cannot and should not”21 be applied in
Scotland. Section 2(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998 only requires that judgments
of the European Court are taken “into account” and as such the Grand Chamber’s
judgment was not binding. Against this, the court noted22 the House of Lords’
statement in R (Anderson) v Home Secretary23 that it “will not without good reason
depart from the principles laid down in a carefully considered judgment of the
[European] court sitting as a Grand Chamber”.24 But as Salduz did not involve
the United Kingdom or examine any of the features of the Scottish criminal justice
system then it could not be said to have been “carefully considered” and although it
“commands great respect, we are not obliged to apply it”.25
C. DISCUSSION
Given the mayhem that could have resulted for prosecutions if the opposite
conclusion had been reached, there may be many on the side of the Crown who
are breathing a sigh of relief. Whether the court was correct in its interpretation
of Salduz may not be known until a subsequent case arises, but it is surely
not the most obvious interpretation. The statement in Salduz that rights “will
in principle be irretrievably prejudiced”26 when admissions made without access
to a lawyer are used in evidence seems pretty conclusive and the fact that the
High Court did not rely on this argument alone suggests that it recognised
that it might be open to criticism on this front. The court’s assertion that its
“balancing process” interpretation is “consistent with the [European] Court’s earlier
case law”27 is not especially persuasive; the “absolute rule” interpretation could
equally be read as consistent with prior case law. The court’s second line of
argument – that it is entitled to disregard a decision of the Grand Chamber of
the European Court –might also be questioned. In Secretary of State for the
Home Department v F,28 a more recent case than Anderson, Lord Hoffmann
20 McLean at para 27.
21 Para 31.
22 Para 29.
23 [2002] UKHL 46, [2003] 1 AC 837.
24 At para 18 per Lord Bingham of Cornhill.
25 Para 29.
26 Salduz at para 55.
27 McLean at para 25.
28 [2009] UKHL 28, [2009] 3 WLR 74.
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suggested that to reject such a decision “would almost certainly put [the UK] in
breach of the international obligation which it accepted when it acceded to the
Convention”.29
Issues of interpretation aside, the question remains of whether suspects are, in fact,
sufficiently protected by the present arrangements. It is true that there are a number
of protections that make the need for legal advice less pressing. This can be contrasted
to the situation in England and Wales, where suspects do have a right to legal advice
during police questioning,30 but where the maximum detention period is longer31
and adverse inferences can be drawn at trial from a failure to answer questions.32
Nonetheless, there are reasons for concern. First, although suspects have a right to
silence, how effective the caution is in informing them of this is debateable, given
that it is only mentioned once, at the start of the interview, when the suspect may
be overwhelmed and confused, and there is no solicitor present to remind him of it
as questioning progresses.33 Secondly, much was made of the fact that confessions
obtained as a result of coercion are inadmissible, and while, by and large, this rule
does seem to have operated protectively, this has not always been the case.34 Thirdly,
one might question the court’s confidence that the police’s discretion to admit legal
representation where the circumstances demand it provides sufficient protection to
vulnerable persons. It will not always be obvious that a suspect is vulnerable35 and
the fact that people do make false confessions36 shows that we should not be too
complacent.37 On the other hand, even if one accepts these concerns, it is perhaps
simplistic to conclude that providing legal advice during police questioning will
prevent miscarriages of justice occurring.38 It might also be said that even if a right to
legal advice was established, there is no guarantee it would be taken up by those who
need it most.39
29 Para 70. See also R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport
[2008] UKHL 15, [2008] 1 AC 1312 at para 37 per Lord Bingham of Cornhill.
30 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s 58.
31 Up to 36 hours under section 41 of the 1984 Act.
32 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s 34.
33 A point made in prior European cases (see those cited in F P Davidson, Evidence (2007) para 9.51)
and indeed alluded to in Salduz itself (at para 54).
34 See e.g. Stewart v Hingston 1997 SLT 442.
35 J Pearse, “Police interviewing: the identification of vulnerabilities” (2006) 5 Journal of Community and
Applied Social Psychology 147; G H Gudjonsson et al, Persons at Risk during Interviews in Police
Custody: The Identification of Vulnerabilities (1994).
36 See e.g. the cases cited in part 3 of G HGudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions:
A Handbook (2003).
37 Admittedly the corroboration requirement provides additional protection, but this has been watered
down considerably where confessions are concerned: see Davidson, Evidence (n 33) paras 15.64-15.71.
38 D Dixon, “Common sense, legal advice and the right of silence” [1991] PL 233 at 242; J Baldwin, The
Role of Legal Representatives at the Police Station (1993).
39 Although in the English context, requests for legal advice did increase after the right was legislated
for: see T Bucke and D Brown, Police Custody: Police Powers and Suspects’ Rights under the Revised
PACE Codes of Practice (1997) 19.
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As a final point, McLean might not represent the end of the matter as it has been
reported that the case will be appealed to the Supreme Court.40 The High Court has
once before found itself overruled by London in a significant case concerning article
6 and the use of statements made by the accused (albeit that the High Court’s ruling
there was in the accused’s favour).41 It remains to be seen whether the High Court’s
decision in McLean will withstand the Supreme Court’s scrutiny.
Fiona Leverick
University of Glasgow
40 “Judges reject police questioning human rights challenge”, Scottish Legal News 23 Oct 2009.
41 Brown v Stott 2001 SC (PC) 43.
